Publications — Edvard Aviles-Meza

2026

The Problem of Introspective Blink

Erkenntnis

The close connection between attention and consciousness is widely acknowledged, yet some philosophers and psychologists defend the phenomenal overflow hypothesis, according to which we are conscious of more in experience than we attend to. While this view has been extensively discussed from a scientific perspective, I approach it from a new angle: its epistemology.

I argue that phenomenal overflow presents a novel epistemological challenge, which I call the problem of introspective blink. This challenge emerges from two truisms: we primarily know our conscious states through introspection, and introspection requires attention. If there is conscious experience outside attention, then there is a puzzle about our subjective access to it.

I propose a solution according to which certain conscious states can be known only through memory. I also argue that this memory model has consequences for cognitive science, offering new resources for addressing skepticism about subjective reports in cases of overflow.

2024

The Neurotic & the Dogmatist

Synthese

The dogmatist claims that experiences with a certain phenomenal character— phenomenal force—are sufficient for immediate perceptual justification. This epistemic sufficiency claim has been challenged on various grounds. The dogmatist might nevertheless preserve the epistemic role of consciousness by arguing that experiences with phenomenal force are necessary for immediate perceptual justification. In this paper, I challenge that necessity claim by examining the psychiatric condition known as derealization.

Selected Work in Progress

Drafts available upon request.

Perceptual Fragmentation

I argue that popular models of belief fragmentation can be extended to perceptual experience. I defend this proposal on explanatory grounds: many putative cases of unconscious perception are better understood as cases of fragmented conscious perception.

The Other Game in Town

I argue that cognitive maps implemented by grid cells provide a robust alternative to the language of thought hypothesis, especially in light of recent evidence concerning so-called navigation cognition.

Dreaming as Machine Learning

I argue that the statistical structure of spontaneous cortical activity supports the hypothesis that spontaneous conscious episodes, including dreaming and daydreaming, play a generative role in learning through simulation.

Misattending

Beliefs are often said to have conditions of satisfaction given by their truth conditions. I argue that we likewise need an account of satisfaction, or fittingness, for states of attention. Distraction in the age of social media, I suggest, undermines the intuitive picture according to which fitting attention simply selects what merits consciousness.

A Third Sense for “Consciousness”

I argue that there is a sense of consciousness that is neither phenomenal consciousness nor cognitive access, but rather agential or practical. Its theoretical importance becomes clear in understanding the distinction between System 1 and System 2 cognition, as well as cases of “zombie action” in visual agnosia.

The Evil Demon Meets the Invisible Gorilla

I argue that hypotheses of unconscious processing in inattentional blindness, blindsight, and aphantasia have a structure analogous to skeptical hypotheses about perceptual knowledge of the external world, but with the focus shifted to introspective memory.